Note to the World's Newest Country: Proceed With Caution

Much of the international community (Omar al-Bashir being a notable exception) is bubbling with excitement as the results of southern Sudan's recent independence referendum are slowly tabulated and made public, confirming what was already the most forgone of forgone conclusions: the south has chosen to become an independent state.

Good for them.  It's easy to root for the long-oppressed and disrespected underdogs here.  Since Sudan gained independence in 1956, the predominantly Christian and culturally distinct south has been subject to the will of a national government in Khartoum that is Islamic and more interested in the Arab world than in the affairs of sub-Saharan Africa.  The north has maintained a relative advantage in economic well-being and political power that is rooted in the country's past under Anglo-Egyptian rule, and the south feels that an alien culture has been forced upon it for many decades.

A case can certainly be made for Sudan as a classic post-colonial mess of disparate ethnic and religious groups cobbled together within arbitrary political boundaries that ultimately can't foster any real social cohesion.  Civil war began eight months before Sudan even gained independence and persisted until 1972, when an uneasy peace was reached that fell apart in 1983, leading to a second lengthy stretch of north-south conflict.  The mid-2000s finally saw some real progress thanks in large part to a heavy push by the international community resulting in a power-sharing agreement and a road map toward southern self-determination.  Despite some bumps along the way, that moment has arrived.

At the risk of being a buzzkill, however, it must be pointed out that becoming an independent state is not an automatic ticket to happiness and prosperity.  Let us keep in mind the following potential stumbling blocks:

Transitioning from Rebellion to Governance
The dominant political entity in the south is the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), a militaristic rebel force that must now govern a democratic state.  The UN mission on the ground is helping to establish a modern standing army and police force, but creating a proper distinction between political power derived from the people and military influence may be tough.  The evolution of a successful democracy will require the military to take a backseat and cede power to civilians.  Any serious political strife could put this to the test, as the army brass might move to fill a power vacuum.

Humanitarian Crisis
The economy of southern Sudan was not that rosy to begin with, yet things have really deteriorated in the past few years.  The number of people in need of food assistance more than quadrupled between 2009 and 2010, and many citizens have been displaced or lost their lives due to conflict in border regions.  This is not an ideal situation under which to start a new state, but it's the reality the south faces.


Abyei 
The border that will separate the new state from Sudan is still being worked out, including a tiny but very important area called Abyei.  There is a conflict here between two groups: the Misseriya nomads, armed by the north, and the Ngok Dinka, who are allied with the south.  A commission to decide the fate of this area allocated much of it to the south, but objection by Khartoum has postponed resolution of this issue.  The north was slow to withdraw troops from Abyei, as it was required to do by the 2005 peace agreement, and if Khartoum wants to instigate renewed fighting, this would be an excellent place to start.

Internal Strife
The south appears to have successfully liberated itself from room of the northern majority, but that does not assure that minorities in the new state will be universally respected and integrated into the new political system.  There have already been some tribal conflicts within the SPLM, and it remains to be seen how the new government will handle any internal ethnic clashes.

Oil
Oh, and there's oil there.  Sudan's oil reserves are split on both sides of the soon-to-be international border, and an agreement on sharing the wealth is far from being properly implemented, with Khartoum likely understating Sudan's true oil revenues at the expense of the south. This could well be a major complication in north-south relations and a potential spark setting off a new wave of conflict.

Foreign Influence
Sudan is geographically the largest African state, and its position between sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world lends it great strategic importance.  It borders nine countries, including Egypt, which cares deeply about the Nile headwaters in southern Sudan and seeks to maintain a strong influence over the country.  Another state heavily invested in Sudan is China, the chief recipient of the country's oil exports.  Such powerful states will go to great lengths to influence the new government, which will have its benefits as well as its drawbacks.


The North
The government in Khartoum is of course dealing with other conflicts as well, chief among them the Darfur situation in the country's west.  This is a state facing great internal tensions and international criticism, and it is about to lose about one third of its territory to a new country many in government don't feel should exist.  This is a recipe for massive insecurity, and the north's reluctance to move troops out of border areas on schedule suggests that they may be looking for an excuse to reignite a war if the opportunity presents itself.

These factors demonstrate why the new state is going to need help to survive and eventually prosper.  The international community cannot simply wash its hands of this now that the referendum is underway and independence is scheduled for July.  This is going to require real assistance and involvement from all countries that have fought for this moment.  A first step is assuring that the UN mission in Sudan remains in the area for quite some time to come.  It's easy to criticize UN peacekeepers as an impotent and expensive waste of resources, but there are some real concrete benefits.  First, they serve as the eyes and ears of the world on the ground, watching for fishy troop movements on either side and helping people flee to safety should skirmishes arise.  Second, they have and should continue to provide assistance in developing the machinery of a modern democracy.  The referendum would not have happened without international assistance from states that know how to set up an election, and advisors can continue to oversee the development of the police force, the transformation of the military, and the institution of an independent judiciary.  Proper funding and monitoring are vital, especially in the early stages, and food assistance is dearly needed.

That said, good luck to our newest country, which should soon have a name and the requisite indicators of sovereign statehood.  Let's hope they have an awesome flag.

The China-Pakistan Nuclear Deal

Way back in 2006, enlightened nuclear proliferation experts (and at least one stupid intern) spoke up against the emerging US-India nuclear cooperation agreement, which allowed India to become the only country with nuclear weapons to legally gain access to nuclear technology and fuel from other countries without signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It took a few years after President Bush and Indian PM Manmohan Singh signed the agreement for the legislatures of both countries to amend relevant statutes, for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to sanction the deal, and for the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to grant an exemption to India, but now the terms of the agreement are being put in place. In the deal, India sought to create the appearance of becoming a more responsible member of the international community by separating its "civilian" nuclear facilities from those it deemed "military," and allowing the IAEA to inspect the former. The "military" facilities will continue to be off limits to international inspectors, and the IAEA accepted this because it will agree to anything that gives it more to inspect, regardless of which extremely important facilities might be kept out of its reach.

The nonproliferation community had quite a few objections to this whole deal. First, anything that allows countries to skirt the NPT and still gain the benefits reserved for the treaty's signatories obviously diminishes the incentive to play by the rules of the international nuclear arms control regime. The NPT framework was instituted in the first place in large part because India used technology intended for civilian purposes to assist the development of its nuclear weapons program. Allowing New Delhi to circumvent this sends, to put it nicely, mixed messages. Second, giving nuclear fuel to India for its "civilian" facilities allows South Asia's superpower to shift more of its indigenous nuclear fuel to its military program, without diminishing its nuclear power capacity. The US will thereby be indirectly enhancing India's ability to build new nukes.

Another big argument against the agreement was that allowing India to ink a special deal with the US would provide an incentive for other actors in the region (read: China and Pakistan) to seek similar deals to keep up. Well, that appears to be happening. China and India's sibling rival, Pakistan, have apparently come to terms on an agreement under which China provides Pakistan with two nuclear reactors. Once again, an NPT-sanctioned nuclear weapons state will be giving nuclear assistance to a country that has developed nukes in defiance of international law. Sec. of State Clinton has spoken out against the deal, but its difficult for the US to get on its high horse after doing more or less the same thing with India. This is surely something Pakistan has wanted for a long time, and it seems that the US-India agreement has crafted the perfect environment for such a deal to be made. One of the good people at Arms Control Wonk summarizes the argument some who were in favor of the India deal are making - basically, that it's just a coincidence that Beijing is making this move now. It's hard to believe, however, that there's no connection. The Bush Administration thought it could cozy up to India through this initiative without serious ramifications, and the current government is forced to deal with the mess.

What's in it for China? One of the most resilient trends in the last 60 years of South Asian affairs has been the China-Pakistan relationship, a mostly one-way affair that sees China give its South Asian buddy gobs of financial aid, new roads and other infrastructural projects, and a whole lot of military assistance. China offers all this as a way to keep Pakistan strong enough to occupy a good deal of India's attention, diverting some strategic pressure off of itself - a goal that becomes ever more important as the world's two most populous countries fly down the path towards superpowerdom. Maintaining a Pakistan strong enough to annoy India also eats up some of the latter's ability to spread its influence across the Asia-Pacific, an area it will be competing with China over for many years to come. China also envisions a strong Pakistan as a wall against Indian influence into western Asia and the Middle East, and Beijing feels that good relations with Islamabad will help it develop ties with the Muslim world. Friendly ties with Pakistan (and its nefarious security service, the ISI) could also help China deal with some of the internal problems it's been having with Muslim separatist groups.

Pakistan has a weak economy, faces chronic budget problems, and must support the needs of its bloated military and 170 million people through very limited resources. China has come through time after time, building huge infrastructure projects such as the port at Gwadar and the Karakorum Highway, contributing billions of dollars in aid and investment, and helping Pakistan build new fighters, frigates, tanks, and military facilities. Beijing has long perceived a strategic interest in helping out poor old Pakistan, and Islamabad has always been happy to accept its generous offers. Now, they may be able to extend this cooperation to the nuclear realm, allowing Pakistan to increase its capacity to build new nuclear weapons should tensions with India once more come to a head. Both China and Pakistan probably see this as a pretty clear cut decision, and feel justified in emulating Bush and Singh's bright idea.

Well, the rest of the world will just have to deal with the consequences.